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Technological development in Latin America 
and the Caribbean 
Jorge A. Sábato* 
Introduction 
T h e scope and limitations of this document are 
as follows: 
(i) I t refers to technology in its broadest 
sense, that is, as the organized body of all 
knowledge used in the production, distribution 
(by trade or any other means) and use of goods 
and services. Accordingly, it encompasses not 
only the scientific and technical knowledge 
generated by research and development 
(R&D), but also that which results from 
empiricism, tradition, manual skills, intuition, 
imitation, adaptation and so on. 
(ii) Secondly, it recognizes that this broad 
scope means that technology is an essential 
component of economic, educational, cultural 
and political systems, and as a result has an 
influence throughout society. However, the 
document restricts itself to analysing techno-
logy as a component of economic and social 
development and it therefore presents an 
analysis of the interface between the structure 
of production and technology without dealing 
with the interfaces between science and 
technology, culture and technology or educa-
tion and technology, except to the extent 
necessary for better understanding of the cen-
tral theme. 
(iii) Another important limitation of this 
document is that the analysis covers most, but 
not all, of the structure of production. It 
includes manufacturing, with its subsectors of 
consumer durables, intermediate goods and 
capital goods, as well as the basic infrastructure 
of energy, transport, communications and so on 
and the so-called "high-technology" industries 
(electronics, computers and data processing, 
nuclear power and the aeronautical industry), 
but it excludes agriculture, forestry, fisheries, 
and the finance and insurance sectors, which 
are outside the author's province. It is possible 
that much of what is asserted for the other 
sectors is valid for these sectors, but this will 
have to be evaluated by competent experts. 
In preparing this document the author has 
endeavoured to bear constantly in mind that: 
(a) Latin America and the Caribbean (here-
inafter referred to as LAC) is not a unit, but a. 
collection of nations which are at very different 
stages of development and which have govern-
ments of different kinds, are carrying out 
development plans with different aims based 
on very different economic policies, are imple-
menting subregional and bilateral agreements 
of various types, possess substantial areas of 
competition, and so on. 
(b) The United States, though it has main-
tained a sort of special relationship with LAC, 
has political, economic, cultural, scientific and 
military interests which extend far beyond the 
context of LAC and its institutions, while at the 
same time it is the political, administrative, 
technical and financial headquarters of most of 
the transnational corporations operating in 
LAC. 
As a result, the policies, strategies and 
actions recommended in this document are not 
those which might be valid for a more homo-
geneous group, but those most capable of being 
undertaken in such a heterogeneous frame-
work, through existing or similar bodies. 
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Technology in LAC: a balance-sheet 
It is necessary to draw up a balance-sheet of the 
situation in order to ascertain what has been 
done and where matters now stand. To begin 
with, it is important to mention that, in the two 
decades following the end of the Second World 
War, an intensive effort was made in Latin 
America to establish a scientific and technical 
infrastructure and create public awareness of 
the importance of science and the urgent need 
to develop this subject in our countries: a 
campaign which was crowned with success in 
the establishment of faculties of science in 
many Latin American universities, research 
institutes and centres, and national councils 
for scientific and technical research. However, 
technology was not very important in this 
effort, because it was assumed that once the 
capacity to produce science was acquired, it 
would flow in a continuos manner and become 
quite smoothly integrated within the structure 
of production, which was anxiously awaiting it. 
It is only in the past decade that attention has 
focussed on problems such as: When, why and 
how is demand for science created in specific 
circumstances? What are the relations between 
science and technology? Is technology merely 
"appl ied science"? How do the flows of supply 
and demand for technology move through the 
various socioeconomic circuits? Who benefits 
from the results of scientific and technological 
research? How and why are the structure of 
production and the scientific and technical 
infrastructure not properly interconnected? 
What relations are there between technology 
and foreign investment? What is technological 
dependence? —and so on and so forth. These 
and other similar questions have been studied 
with thoroughness and originality, leading to 
significant progress both in the academic 
field —in other words the field of studies and 
research on the group of problems involved in 
science, technology, development and depen-
dence— and in the political field, which 
covers the action taken to use science and 
technology to attain specific objetives of eco-
nomic and social development, as summarized 
below: 
Recognition of the existence of structural 
obstacles to scientific and technical progress. 
Study of these obstacles made it possible to 
draw a distinction between explicit and im-
plicit scientific policy; to understand the 
causes of the usual attitudes of the governing 
élites to science and technology (hostility, 
lukewarm support or indifference); to explain 
apparent contradictions, such as the relative 
advance of certain branches of science (such as 
biology) and the backwardness of others (such 
as geology); to discover the impact of the 
import-substituting model of development on 
the assimilation of technology; to create aware-
ness of the existence of a new international 
division of labour, centred on the production 
and consumption of technology; and so on. The 
practical result was the explicit formulation of 
science and technology policies and the estab-
lishment of appropriate bodies (ministries and 
the like) to implement them. Outstanding 
examples are Decisions 84 and 85 of the 
Andean Pact, the Science and Technology Plan 
prepared by CONACYT in Mexico (1976), the 
organization of the CNP (Conselho Nacional de 
Pesquisas) in Brazil, etc. 
Recognition of the importance of techno-
logy as a carrier of values, so that importing 
technology means importing not only an 
organized body of knowledge, but also the 
production relations which gave rise to it, the 
sociocultural characteristics of the market for 
which it was originally devised, and so forth. 
Technology transmits the value system for 
which it was designed, just as if it bore a 
"genetic code" within its structure. This means 
that the scope of technological dependence 
goes far beyond merely economic considera-
tions. 
Comprehensive study of trade in techno-
logy on the basis of recognition that technology 
is a valuable commodity in the system of 
production, and that most movements of 
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technology occur through trade and not 
through free transfers. This study was also 
accompanied by an examination of the techno-
logy market, highlighting its imperfections, 
criticizing its worst distortions and unfair 
practices, penetrating into the sanctified area of 
industrial property and discovering the im-
portance of "unpackaging" in the importation 
of technology, The result has been the intro-
duction of measures to analyse and control the 
flow of imported technology (for example, the 
establ ishment of registers of technology), to 
govern relations with foreign investment 
(Decision 24 of the Andean Pact), to revise 
legislation on industrial property (as in Brazil 
and Mexico), etc. 
Verification that most imports of techno-
logy have occurred through direct foreign 
investment, with recognition of the growing 
role of the transnational corporations in pro-
ducing and marketing technology, the growing 
importance of movements of technology bet-
ween the head offices of such corporations 
and their subsidiaries, and recognition that the 
concept of industrial property has broadned to 
include property which is not legally protected 
and is known as quasi-property (know-how, 
engineer ing services, trade names, place in the 
market and so on), which accounts for an 
increasing volume of commercial technologi-
cal operations. 
Recognition that the process of industria-
lization is leading to a growing L'technologi-
zation" of LAC, measured in terms of the larger 
number of persons from various levels of 
society who have acquired scientific abilities 
or technical skills, giving rise to an important 
qualitative change in the structure of employ-
ment. T h e local output of technology is small 
compared with the flow of imported techno-
logy, but some encouraging successes have 
been recorded (PEMEX in Mexico, agricul-
tural machinery in Argentina, machine tools in 
Brazil, and so on), as well as progress in "un-
packaging" technology (Atucha nuclear power 
station in Argentina; the Brazilian iron and 
steel plan; petrochemicals in the Andean Pact, 
and so on) and growing activity in the field of 
adaptation of imported technology to local 
conditions, which means that the flow of 
internal innovatory activity is by no means non-
existent. The first cases of substantial exports of 
packaged and unpackaged technology are 
be ing recorded, and measures are being in-
troduced to support and encourage them (pre-
ferential credits, tax relief, favourable exchan-
ge rates). Exports of capital and technology 
within the region, especially from the three 
largest countries, are beginning to acquire 
importance. Brazil, for example, exported 
unpackaged technology worth US$ 135 million 
in 1975, against a total of only US$ 3 million 
in 1967. 
Critical analyses of multilateral and bi-
lateral co-operation and assitance in the field 
of science and technology, and of the bodies 
and executing agencies involved. These have 
led to corresponding stimulation of a new 
strategy for co-operation and negotiation at the 
regional level (OAS and SELA), the subregio-
nal level (Andean Pact) and the international 
level (United Nations agencies), and adoption 
of a new attitude to the United States (de-
claration by the CACTAL conference, position 
in UNIDO and UNCTAD and so forth). 
Increases in local consultancy and engi-
neering capacity, in some cases to international 
levels of quality and quantity, thus making it 
possible to extend such services, in open 
competition, outside national frontiers and 
even outside LAC. 
Significant increases in scientific and 
technical exchanges among the countries of 
the region and with the rest of the world. 
So far, we have indicated the most signifi-
cant advances. In order to complete the ba-
lance-sheet it is now necessary to mention the 
areas where there has been no progress, and 
possibly even retrogression. Perhaps the most 
important of all these areas is the limited 
impact, in the field of technology, of the 
science and technology development plans 
implemented in various countries, and the 
failure to link the structure of production and 
the scientific and technological infrastructure. 
In contrast to science which can develop in the 
isolated environment of a university, academy, 
institute or laboratory, technology operates in a 
much larger area of society, that of the units of 
the structure of production, with a wide range 
of active participants. In particular, entrepre-
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neurs and managers in the industrial sector and 
farmers in the agricultural sector are of funda-
mental importance in introducing technology 
in their activities. These activities, however, 
have been and remain totally isolated from the 
policies, strategies, plans, agencies and actions 
related to technological development, which, 
as a result, have remained as if floating in a 
socioeconomic void, without real links with 
reality. In short, technology has so far been 
handled more as an item of data than as an 
operational variable to which the tools of 
economic policy must be applied if it is truly 
wished to achieve some impact on reality. 
The importation of technology, whether by 
subsidiaries of the transnational corporations, 
private national enterprises or by State enter-
prises, is effected first and foremost in the light 
of the micro-economic interests of such enter-
prises, regardless of the ecological, socioeco-
nomic and cultural consequences. There is 
implicit or explicit acceptance that certain 
assumptions are firm truths: (a) that technology 
from the central countries is the only, the best, 
and the most suitable technology; (b) that 
technology is neutral, in other words, value-
free; (c)that any "modern" technology will, by 
definition, be of the greatest use for develop-
ment; (d) that this technology is sufficiently 
well tested, and that its introduction therefore 
poses no risks. I t is forgotten that such techno-
logies are designed in the light of the availabi-
lity of factors and resources in the country 
where they were created; that for that very 
reason they are capital-intensive and energy-
intensive; that they are aimed fundamentally 
at meet ing the needs of sectors of the popula-
tion of those countries which, because of their 
incomes, stand far above the mass sectors of the 
importing country, so that a technology which, 
in a central country, meets the needs of a large 
number of consumers can, in a peripheral 
country, be of use only for the elites, etc. 
Local production of technology has not 
been properly promoted: it has not been given 
the protection essential to permit competition 
with imported technology, nor has it been 
possible to introduce efficient means for its 
production. 
Studies on technology in the fields of food, 
housing and health fall below those carried out 
for the industrial sector in terms of quality and 
quantity, so that they have received little 
attention, while the importation of technology 
for use in the production of goods and services 
for the privileged sectors has continued to 
increase. 
There is still no .sound theory on the role 
which the State should play as a producer and 
as an owner of units (industries, banks, busi-
ness, insurance, and so on) which are major 
consumers of technology and which frequendy 
behave vis-à-vis science and technology as 
regressively as the private sector, or even more 
so, thus giving the lie to the belief that 
nationalizing a unit of production or bringing it 
into the hands of the State is sufficient to put 
an end to its technological dependence. 
The brain drain has continued, and in a 
number of countries has increased, basically 
because of political persecution and ideolo-
gical discrimination. 
Demand for local technology remains 
weak, since under the prevailing rationale of 
the structure of production it continues to be 
more convenient to import technology than to 
produce it or purchase it locally. 
Regional and subregional co-operation, 
which are essential for achieving the "critical 
mass" and thus jointly tackling the multitude of 
problems which need to be solved, are making 
slow progress, and in particular the ability to 
fulfil the formal undertakings entered into is 
very inadequate. No machinery has been 
established for trade co-operation in the field of 
technology. 
Technological dependence and techno-
logical dualism have been denounced vigor-
ously, but not thoroughly studied, and there is 
still no proper strategy to overcome them. 
No country of the area, with the possible 
exception of Brazil, has yet passed from a 
defensive strategy, consisting of such actions as 
strengthening the infrastructure, operating 
registers of technology, and so on, to an at-
tacking strategy, with emphasis on the produc-
tion of technology and on aggressive negotia-
tions with the external suppliers of technology. 
It is urgently necessary to recognize that the 
defensive strategy has a structural and opera-
tional upper limit, and that this limit can only 
be passed by going over to an attacking strategy. 
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The scientific and technical infrastructure 
is not l inked either with the structure of pro-
duction or with its own "owner", the State, 
thus showing that institutional obstacles of a 
socio-political and cultural nature can be as 
important as strictly economic obstacles. 
Local efforts at scientific and technological 
development continue to be weak, and only 
Brazil has planned a significant change, 
through its Second Plan for Scientific and 
Technological Development, which provided 
for investments of the order of US$ 2,700 mil-
lion for the three years 1975 to 1977. This situa-
tion is all the more serious since economic, 
material and human resources continue to be 
used very inefficiently. Skilled personnel still 
do not receive proper social and political rec-
ognition. 
In these efforts there is a clear absence of 
projections and decisions regarding the rela-
tion between technology and the quality of life 
in the broadest sense. If this situation is not 
rapidly corrected, the consequences will be 
serious. 
II 
Objectives and strategies 
A possible common objective 
T h e above outline of the present situation 
defines the frame of reference within which it 
will be necessary to specify objectives and 
strategies for the better use of technology in the 
socioeconomic development of LAC. Three 
conclusions should be emphasized: 
(a) There is now clear awareness that the 
problems are highly complex; much more so 
than was naively thought in previous decades. 
As Máximo Halty clearly put it: 
"The first step towards solving a problem is to 
know that the problem exists. This step has 
been taken. Simplistic solutions have gradually 
been put aside: the problem is not solved 
merely by training skilled technical staff and 
increasing research funds. Neither is the eva-
luation and control of the importation of tech-
nology, with all its strategic importance, a 
complete solution on its own and in itself. The 
two are necessary but not sufficient con-
ditions...". 
(b) The LAC countries are basically con-
sumers of technology but poor producers. As a 
result, they are spectators and not actors: 
passive recipients of what others do in the light 
of their own needs and interests, and they thus 
inexorably tend to adopt the general outlook of 
the suppliers, against which mere rhetorical 
protest is of no use. This leads to one of two 
equally harmful positions: to the worst kind of 
technolatry —slavish copying or imitation— or 
to furious denunciations of technology, which 
are completely sterile if no viable alternatives 
are proposed. 
(c) International co-operation has taken 
place particularly in respect of the science/ 
technology interface, and the greatest efforts 
have been applied to creating and strengthen-
ing the scientific and technical infrastructure 
(training of staff, exchange of scientific and 
technical personnel, equipping of laboratories 
and pilot plants, establishment of institutions, 
technical service centres, etc.), and carrying out 
academic and field research on the many 
aspects of the problems of science, technology 
and development. The programmes applied to 
the interface between technology and the 
structure of production have been few in 
number, and so far very limited in scope and 
resources. 
There is no doubt, in these circumstances, 
that the next stage should focus on objectives 
which are directly related to technology as an 
operational variable in and for the system of 
production, and should proceed on the basis of 
overall attacking strategies which are consis-
tent with the objectives and strategies of socio-
economic development. A fundamental preli-
minary question immediately arises: in view of 
the large number ofnations which make up the 
continent, each with its own interests and its 
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own conception of economic and social devel-
opment, will it be feasible to define objectives 
and strategies which are useful for all in such a 
way as to make firmly based and continuing co-
operation possible and desirable? We are not 
referring, of course, to co-operation to strength-
en the scientific and technical infrastructure, 
which can and should continue, since a firm 
basis exists for it, but to the area of socio-
economic development, because co-operation 
in the exchange of scholarship-holders and 
teachers, the organization of courses and semi-
nars, the equipping of libraries and laborato-
ries, and so on, is one matter, while tackling 
problems so bound up with power and interests 
as the regulation of imports of technology, 
reform of industrial property laws, and the 
evaluation oí technology in relation to income 
distribution, for example, is very different. 
What is convenient and desirable for country A 
may not be so for country B; thus, A may pursue 
socioeconomic development through extreme 
liberalization vis-à-vis foreign investment and 
technology, while B, in contrast, may pursue 
the same goal by restricting and controlling 
such investment; country C may hope to im-
prove its non-traditional exports through the 
massive assimilation of imported technology, 
while D may give priority to meeting the basic 
needs of its rural population (food, health and 
housing), sharply reducing imports of tech-
nology for use in the production of luxury items 
and applying its greatest efforts to the develop-
ment of indigenous technology, and so forth. 
This is a consequence of the very nature of 
technology and its full participation in the 
process of production, which means that every-
thing related to it is necessarily linked to 
conflicts of interests between classes, groups, 
countries, and so on. Any decision on technolo-
gy benefits some and harms others, just as 
occurs with other variables of socioeconomic 
progress, such as wages, rents, interest, etc. In 
itself, there is nothing bad about this, since it is 
a natural consequence of the prevailing rules of 
the society; what is really important is to be 
aware that the situation is thus, and this is often 
forgotten or ignored, perhaps because tech-
nology is often confused with science. In 
scientific matters conflicts are usually acade-
mic, while in the field of technology they are 
political. "The capacity of technology to trans-
form the nature and orientation of development 
is such that whoever controls technology con-
trols development. Thus this is a fundamental-
ly political issue" (Dag Hammarskjõld Foun-
dation). 
The argument of this document is that it is 
possible to define at least one objective which, 
since it is shared by each of the countries, 
makes co-operation among all of them possible 
and desirable; this objective is that each so-
vereign nation should, by definition, attempt to 
achieve an autonomous capacity to handle 
technology, so as to be able to direct it and use 
it in the way most convenient and appropriate 
to its interests and objectives. However op-
posed the interests of nations A and B, or C and 
D, each and every one of them needs to know 
how to handle technology, just as it needs to 
know how to handle taxes, currency, income 
distribution and external trade. 
Only insofar as a nation acquires this 
capacity for handling technology will it be able 
to achieve the desired objective of converting 
technology into a special tool for its own 
development, an operational variable in the 
system of production, subject to its own deci-
sions and not to those of others. In this 
complicated game there is a crucial dilemma: 
either one manages technology, or one ends up 
by being managed by it. Whatever each nation 
does with the technology once it has learned to 
manage it will be exclusively a matter for its 
own policy, and its decisions in this regard will 
be taken in the light of its own plans and 
programmes, its specific characteristics and its 
degree of interdependence with other nations. 
Why does the pursuit of this objective 
make co-operation between nations desirable? 
In the first place, because such co-operation is 
an essential element in achieving a local 
capacity to produce technology, the effort to 
secure which will, because of its magnitude in 
terms of human and material resources, neces-
sarily demand all the co-operation which can 
possibly be obtained. Moreover, such joint 
action also offers the participating countries 
greater latitude and makes it possible to achie-
ve reasonable scales of operation. Secondly, 
because concerted action will help to develop 
the capacity to identify and formulate specific 
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN / Jorge A. Sábato 87 
technological requests, a capacity which is 
notably absent at the moment Finally, because 
it will make it possible to negotiate with the 
United States and other nations which provide 
technology to the region from a position of 
greater strength. 
Considered as a political and social pro-
cess, knowing how to manage technology also 
means knowing how to define it in the terms 
which are most convenient and appropriate to 
the objectives proposed, knowing how to pro-
duce it using one's own resources, knowing 
how to select it from the existing local or 
foreign stock, and finally knowing how to use it 
in the existing socioeconomic circumstances. 
Two areas must be distinguished in all this: 
Area I, that of the structure of production of 
goods and services, where technology behaves 
as a commodity and the problem consists in the 
smooth and reliable supply, in quality and 
quantity, of the technology needed for the 
area's proper operation, in keeping with the 
inherent rationale of fliis structure of produc-
tion and using the machinery and channels 
which normally operate within it; 
Area II, that of the "global problems", 
where managing technology means knowing 
how to use it effectively to solve problems 
which, by their very nature, extend beyond the 
framework of the structure of production, such 
as weather control, the development of hydro-
graphical basins, forest or desert management, 
the occurrence and control of natural disasters, 
urban planning, control of the environment, 
health protection, and so on. 
In both areas the management of technolo-
gy comprises various stages, as summarized in 
the following diagram: 
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It is clear that the rules are different in the 
two areas, as are the principal participants. In 
area I the economic system rules, and the 
principal protagonists are the entrepreneurs 
(private and public, national and foreign, in-
dustrial, commercial and agricultural), because 
they are directly responsible for producing the 
goods and services and therefore for taking the 
final decisions regarding the technology to be 
used. The State participates in its dual function 
as regulator and controller of the structure of 
production, and as owner of productive enter-
prises. In area II, on the other hand, it is 
fundamentally the system of penalties and 
rewards that governs the behaviour of the State 
as the entity responsible for managing the 
territory of the country and its resources, the 
health and protection of its inhabitants, the 
provision of urban infrastructure, defence 
against natural and social disasters, and so on. 
In both areas I and II local production of 
technology is an essential element for 
achieving the desired autonomous capacity, 
not least because it will permit better manage-
ment of the importation of technology and of 
technical assistance, for a sound local produc-
tive capacity substantially strengthens a coun-
try's bargaining position. 
While for thousands of years man pro-
duced technology in a spontaneous, unsys-
tematic and almost amateurish way (i.e., in the 
manner of the craftsmen of those days), in 
recent decades this mode of production has 
sharply changed, and has been converted into a 
specific, organized, differentiated and conti-
nuous activity with its own identity, its own 
legitimacy and its own economic characteris-
tics. Just as everyday goods are produced in 
establishments broadly referred to as factories, 
the same occurs with technology, with the 
difference that the technology factories or firms 
are given such names as "research and devel-
opment laboratories", "R&D departments", 
and so on. In area I in the developed countries 
the technology factories and firms are the 
largest and most efficient units producing 
technology, and represent one of the funda-
mental components of the power of the trans-
national corporations. 
The situation is different in area I of the 
LAC countries, however, where the production 
of technology fundamentally remains at the 
craftsman level; while such production is im-
portant and therefore should be suitably en-
couraged, it is far from enough to enable these 
countries to become efficient producers of 
technology. 
The technology used to tackle the global 
problems of area II usually —although not 
always— originates from specialized applied 
research institutes along the lines of those 
dealing with lake studies, integrated basin 
studies, seismology and soil dynamics, urban 
planning, infant nutrition, and so on. The vast 
majority are State, para-State or university 
institutions, and the results of their work are 
distributed much more by means of technical 
assistance than by means of trade. These 
institutes provide services which are very 
important for the community and undoubtedly 
provide a basis for the knowledge and control 
of natural resources, the natural and human 
environment, natural and social disasters, and 
so on. In all the LAC countries there are 
institutions of this type, and in many cases they 
have achieved significant successes: indeed, 
some of them have acquired international 
prestige. 
Only in the last few years have the princi-
pal aspects of the importation of technology 
into LAC begun to be understood, thanks to the 
establishment of National Registers of Tech-
nology. 
Since this procedure has been introduced 
not only in various countries in LAC, but in 
many others in the Third World, the importa-
tion of technology is becoming more open, and 
this will in due course make it possible to bring 
into effect appropriate regulating legislation, 
like that which exists for the importation of 
other commodities. It will then be possible to 
control imports of technology in terms of cost, 
use (reducing or eliminating provisions restric-
ting its use) and content. Among the most 
important consequences of this process are the 
negotiations at present under way within 
UNCTAD to formulate a Code of Conduct for 
the Transfer of Technology. 
In order to ensure that the supply of 
technology in area I is properly managed, the 
LAC countries should concern themselves first 
and foremost with promoting the local produc-
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Hon of technology and controlling its importa-
tion. These two processes should be carried out 
simultaneously, since one is supported by the 
other, because imports cannot be replaced if 
there is no local replacement, and it is not 
possible to produce locally without a certain 
degree of protectionism against external pro-
duction. 
The promotion of production requires ac-
tion both in the field of demand and in the field 
of supply. The promotion of demand for local 
technology can only be successful if the pre-
vailing rationale of the structure of production 
is adapted to this end, which means using 
fiscal, economic and financial incentives to 
increase the consumption of local technology 
and introducing penalties of the same types for 
the unnecessary use of imported technology. A 
certain degree of technological protectionism 
will necessarily have to be established, not by 
means of "ad valorem" tariffs, but through 
preferences of a qualitative type, since in 
general technology is purchased on the basis of 
its "quali ty" and the trust inspired but its 
supplier, rather than its price. One possible 
mechanism for qualitative technological pro-
tectionism would be the giving of preference to 
local consulting and engineering firms in fea-
sibility studies and design work on investment 
projects in the public sector, as in the Argentine 
legislation on "national contracts"; the pur-
chase of locally produced capital goods, the 
engagement of skilled personnel of local ori-
gin, and so on. 
In order to improve supply, it will be 
necessary to strengthen the scientific and tech-
nological infrastructure and encourage the es-
tablisment and operation of enterprises pro-
ducing technology, consultant services, en-
gineering and design services, and auxiliary 
technical services. This encouragement should 
also make use of the machinery and procedures 
which are accepted and used in the structure of 
production: bank credit, reduction of taxes, 
other fiscal benefits, etc. The quasi-artisanal 
production which takes place within enter-
prises in the structure of production should also 
be suitably encouraged, for example by per-
mitting tax deductions in respect of expendi-
ture on the production of technology, with 
"soft" credits for the development of proto-
types and the establishment and operation of 
pilot plants, and so forth. 
The encouragement of production should 
be complemented with vigorous promotion of 
exports of technology, which have already 
been successfully started in various LAC coun-
tries and which are likely to experience ex-
plosive growth in the next few decades, es-
pecially towards the Third World, where coun-
tries which are still at an earlier stage of 
development find that technologies from LAC 
are more suitable than those from the central 
countries. In particular, the export of techno-
logical services is of the greatest importance, 
since it prepares the ground for the subsequent 
export of technological items, capital goods, 
etc. 
As regards the control of imports of tech-
nology, the principal aim here is not to reduce 
the volume but to improve the quality and 
importance of what is imported, to bring it into 
line with local needs and resources, and to 
improve the terms on which the imports occur. 
In fact imports of technology are not only not 
going to decline, but are very likely to increase, 
insofar as the development of LAC becomes 
more thoroughgoing and extensive; what is 
needed is to avoid superfluous imports, re-
placing them by imports which are really 
essential and are negotiated on the basis of fair 
and non-restrictive conditions. 
It is clear from the above that policies to 
promote the production of technology and 
control its importation must be mutually con-
sistent, so as to ensure a smooth flow of 
technology which is suited to the structure of 
production. 
Choice of technology 
In recent years there has been increasing 
awareness of the need that all technology, 
before being supplied and used, must be 
selected from among various alternatives so as 
to ensure that the most appropriate technology 
has been chosen. This process of elimination 
should be applied not only to imported tech-
nologies, but also to those produced locally, 
since these are in many cases copies and 
adaptations of foreign technologies and as a 
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result transmit the value system carried by 
their "genetic code", also sometimes called 
their "ideological content". 
Of course, each country will make this 
selection on the basis of its own criteria and for 
its own purposes, but co-operation among 
various countries will be very useful in de-
fining more precisely the questions of: (a) Why 
to select; (b) What to select; and (c) How to-
select. 
Some limitations 
At this point in the document it is necessary to 
realize that technology, even when selected 
with the greatest care and supplied to areas I 
and II with maximum efficiency, is not a 
"magic wand" which solves everything, a 
"cu re" for all the evils of underdevelopment, 
a "key" to open all the doors to happiness. It is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition to en-
able the LAC countries to pass beyond their 
present stage of development and succeed in 
reducing poverty, backwardness, malnutrition, 
disease and so on; to that end technology 
should be used in accordance with appropriate 
overall policies and with plans and program-
mes for socioeconomic development which are 
designed to solve these problems. Technology 
is sometimes expected to eliminate or reduce 
unemployment , protect ecosystems, uphold 
cultural independence, and the like, at the 
same time as it is being used in a context which 
ignores such objectives or —worse still— im-
plicitly defends what it rhetorically purports to 
be combating. These are complex demands 
which cannot be satisfied merely by using 
appropriate technologies, although it is true 
that this can help, sometimes to a significant 
extent. There is a danger ofproposing solutions 
which are unattainable, or which are not solu-
tions at all but merely desires expressed with 
attractive rhetoric but little profundity. Thus, 
for example, the demand is often heard in LAC 
that modern capital-intensive and energy-in-
tensive technologies should no be introduced 
into rural areas, but that the traditional tech-
nologies, appropriately improved and adapted, 
should be maintained. This position, which has 
a certain validity and enjoys a degree of 
recognition in mainland China, India, Indone-
sia, and so on, would seem to be difficult to 
apply in our continent. In the first place LAC is 
no longer rural, although it has rural sectors 
which have very rapidly been "opened up to 
the world", with the help of geographical 
mobility (in contrast to Asia, there are no large 
isolated plateaux). Moreover, it has a single 
language which unifies and promotes integra-
tion, widespread urban life patterns, growing 
penetration by industrial goods, a touching 
19th century faith in Progress, and great ad-
miration and respect for Technology with its 
magic products (radio, the cinema, TV, the 
telephone, antibiotics, electricity, agricultural 
machinery, and so on). 
Finally, this position is difficult to uphold 
because the greater productivity of modern 
technologies makes their introduction almost 
inevitable. This does not mean that these 
technologies are the only possible ones, or that 
they must necessarily be capital-intensive and 
energy-intensive, for other solutions, better 
suited to the availability of local resources and 
factors, might be imagined and possibly devel-
oped, but this will only be possible by means of 
an intensive research and development effort 
and not simply through a sort of romantic "re-
turn to Nature". If modern technology is not 
appropriate and convenient, the only accept-
able response is to produce even more up-to-
the-minute technology,, which is appropriate 
and convenient. 
Furthermore, some criticisms of modern 
technologies, both for the agricultural and for 
the manufacturing sector, unfairly forget that 
the only way of breaking away from the old 
international division of labour has involved 
the use of technologies which, because of the 
increased productivity they brought to the 
economy, have enabled some underdeveloped 
countries to begin to produce industrial goods 
on acceptable terms. Without the help of those 
technologies, these countries would probably 
have continued to be mere producers of raw 
materials. 
In short, this complex subject requires 
much more research before the present stage 
can be passed. 
Some important obstacles 
In order to attain the desired objective it will be 
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necessary to overcome a group of* obstacles of 
varying importance, including: 
(a) The groups of interests which benefit 
from technological dependence and will not 
remain indifferent to a vigorous programme 
aiming at technological independence. 
(b) The weakness of the State, which must 
play a leading role, and its meagre capacity to 
implement and ensure the implementation of 
decisions of a technological nature. 
(c) The intellectual alienation of those 
groups in the ruling class which hold that 
nothing can change because "we are not capa-
b le" , and others which hold that nothing can 
change because "they won't let us". 
(d) The existing rationale, according to 
which it is better business to import technology 
than to produce it locally. 
(e) Cultural dependence, holding that 
Two fundamental strategies are proposed: a 
strategy of co-operation, to help to make tech-
nological autonomy in LAC viable, and a 
strategy of negotiation, to help to make equi-
table interdependence between LAC and the 
United States on a basis of solidarity possible. 
T h e strategy of co-operation should aim at 
the same general ends in both areas I and II: to 
support the national plans and programmes for 
technological development, to carry out a 
coherent set of actions to strengthen national 
efforts and expand their scope of operation, and 
to co-operate with the programmes of other 
subregional, regional and international bodies. 
However, the development of such a strategy 
cannot be the same in areas I and II: it will take 
place in each of them in conformity with their 
particular characteristics. Equally, it will not 
take place with the same intensity throughout 
the whole wide range of possibilities, but must 
select some priority directions where efforts 
will be particularly concentrated so as to use 
the scarce resources available with maximum 
efficiency. 
"any foreign technology is better... because it is 
foreign". 
(f) The prevailing system of values, which 
gives action to provide for superfluous con-
sumption by the elites priority over providing 
for essential consumption by the majority of the 
population. 
(g) The slavish imitation practised by the 
periphery, whereby even the worst products 
and processes from the centre are copied. 
(h) Local financial machinery, which fails 
to provide risk capital for the production of 
technology, will provide backing for any "pres-
tigious" imports of technology. 
(j) The poor links between the principal 
participants in the process: State officials, 
entrepreneurs and managers, scientists and 
technologists. 
Bearing in mind the particular characteris-
tics of area I, it is proposed that the co-operation 
should focus on the two following lines: 
(a) Promotion of production of technology, 
through action aimed at greatly strengthening 
the capacity to produce technology and pro-
moting the creation of bilateral, multilateral 
and subregional capabilities which, at an ap-
propriate time, could come to be articulated in 
a genuine regional technological capability. 
The promotion of production should in-
clude both industrial and quasi-artisanal pro-
duction, as well as the protection of them from 
foreign technology. The extension of produc-
tion and protectionism to the whole region 
might be achieved through such appropriate 
instruments as the operation of Latin American 
technology enterprises, agreements for tech-
nological complementarity, regional prefer-
ences, etc. 
(b) Promotion of trade in technology 
among the LAC countries, so as to increase the 
present meagre flow significantly, control the 
importation of foreign technology by seeking a 
III 
Possible strategies 
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reduction in the redundant imports which 
occur when various countries import the same 
technology, and develop adequate economic 
room to permit autonomous technological de-
velopment. 
Trade promotion should encompass both 
technology embodied in goods and in human 
knowledge and technology which is not em-
bodied in technological goods and services, 
and as a result should cover capital goods, the 
emigration and immigration of skilled person-
nel, consulting services, design and engi-
neering services, and so on. The instruments 
used should naturally be compatible with those 
used in trade within Latin America in general. 
Just as in area I the strategy of co-operation 
proposed highlights the production of and 
trade in technology, for area II it is proposed 
that the co-operation should develop on the 
basis of "joint projects for production and 
technical assistance". It has already been noted 
that, because of the very nature of the global 
problems of area II, technical assistance is 
more important than trade; thus, for example, if 
country A has developed a given technology for 
flood control, while country B needs it for 
application on its own territory, it is very 
unusual for the technology to pass from A to B 
by means of trade; it is most likely to be 
transferred under an agreement between A and 
B, which might possibly include some pay-
ment, but not in terms of an actual price for the 
technology. 
An important aspect of the global problems 
is that, by their nature, although one of them 
may be specific to one country or a sub-group of 
countries (for example, the protein deficit), 
there will certainly be another which is specific 
to another sub-group (for example, the eco-
system of desert zones) and so on and so forth, 
so that the set of problems as a whole will in fact 
be of equal interest to all the countries and, as a 
result, co-operation will prove to be of genuine 
mutual interest. There are also problems of 
regional —and even worldwide— scope, such 
as general weather control, earthquake predic-
tion and control, exploitation of the seabed, 
mass hunger and poverty, the exhaustion of 
natural resources, waste management (indus-
trial, mineral, nuclear and so on), urban mar-
ginality, world population growth, and so on, 
which will be impossible to study and solve 
without co-operation by all, which is therefore 
an ineluctable imperative. 
The principal characteristics of the "joint 
projects" would be as follows: 
(a) They would be defined and organized 
around problems to be solved, and not around 
disciplines. For example, there might be a joint 
project for the development and use of tropical 
forests, but not a silviculture project; for the 
replacement of animal protein in mass diets, 
bu t not a protein chemistry project; for the 
ecological control of marginal problems, but 
not an ecology project; for the use of non-
bauxitic ores for aluminium productions, but 
not a mineralogy project, and so on. 
(b) Thus defined, the projects will neces-
sarily be multidisciplinary, and although some 
will be linked more to the "hard" sciences such 
as physics and chemistry and others to the 
"soft" sciences such as sociology and anthropo-
logy, the solution of the problems will require 
knowledge from various sources and disci-
plines. Moreover, although applied research 
will be one of their fundamental tools, the 
projects will not make use of "applied scien-
ce" , but of "technology", because their final 
objective is not to inquire into the problems, 
but to propose solutions, and for that purpose 
they will be able to use knowledge of any origin 
and nature, provided that it is useful for that 
purpose. 
(c) The projects will aim to develop tech-
nological solutions which are feasible, viable, 
appropriate and convenient, on the basis of 
definitions and criteria explicitly set out in the 
programmes themselves. 
(d) The joint projects will encompass all 
the stages, ranging from prefeasibility and fea-
sibility studies to the production of technology 
—which will contain an appropriate mix of 
local and foreign technology— and its applica-
tion and full use by society. The countries 
participating in each project will endeavour to 
participate fully in all these stages, so as to 
transform the static transfer from the owner to 
the recipient into a dynamic transfer in which 
all the participants give and receive. 
(e) The joint action will mean that the 
countries which wish to embark on a specific 
project aimed at solving a problem of common 
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interest will define the nature and structure of 
the project, the terms of their participation and 
the adaptation and use of the technological 
solution achieved and other technologies 
which it may have been possible to generate in 
the process. 
(f) The projects will be implemented by 
suitable institutions such as research institutes, 
technology enterprises, university laborato-
ries, research centres and so on, which will co-
ordinate the organization, administration, con-
trol and implementation of each project. 
(g) It will be essential, for each project, to 
ensure that it is related as closely as possible to 
the circumstances which it is supposed to 
improve; otherwise there will be a risk of 
producing solutions which might be satisfacto-
ry to their authors but impossible to apply. For 
this reason, the various interest groups linked 
with the problem which is to be solved should 
be properly represented in the management of 
the project. Thus, for example, in an endeavour 
to solve the problem of improving the everyday 
diet of the mass of the people through the 
addition of proteins to bread, the body respon-
sible for managing the joint project should 
contain representatives not only of the scien-
tists and technologists participating in the 
project, but also of the bakers who may possibly 
produce and market the new type of bread, the 
manufacturers of bread-making equipment, the 
producers of the raw materials used in pro-
ducing bread, and so on. 
(h) The final form of applying the solution 
reached will depend on the specific circums-
tances of each project. Although in general this 
will be done by means of technical assistance, 
there will undoubtedly be cases where it is 
most desirable to do so by means of trade. Thus, 
for example, in the case of flood control, the 
technological solution found will no doubt be 
transferred in the form of technical assistance; 
but in the case of the new type of bread, it is 
likely that marketing of the solution through 
the specific channels of the sector (for example, 
the manufacturers of bread-making equip-
ment) will be not only the most rapid and 
efficient way of achieving the goal sought (to 
improve the diet of the masses), but perhaps 
the only feasibly way, despite the difficulties 
inherent in it. 
(i) In the global projects which are regional 
or worldwide in scope, where because of their 
magnitude and complexity scientific, technical 
and economic leadership will in fact be in the 
hands of the developed countries, LAC will 
nevertheless demand genuine co-operation 
and, as a result, full participation in decision-
taking and in the benefits. 
The strategy of negotiation in the field of 
technology between LAC and the United Sta-
tes must naturally be part of the strategy of 
general negotiation between the two sides 
which is carried out in various forums. In the 
specific case of technological negotiations, the 
central concern should be to ensure that the 
United States recognizes that it is in its own 
political interest that the LAC countries should 
pass beyond their present stage of technologi-
cal dependence, and that it should undertake to 
co-operate actively to ensure that this occurs in 
the shortest possible time and at the lowest 
possible cost. 
The technological negotiations should en-
compass at least the following subjects: 
(a) Regulation of trade in technology be-
tween LAC and the United States, under a 
"Code of Conduct for the Transfer of Technolo-
gy", identical or similar to that currently being 
drawn up within the United Nations; 
(b) Regulation of the behaviour of the 
United States-based transnational corpora-
tions, as far as technology is concerned, by 
means of provisions identical or similar to those 
which will appear in the United Nations "Code 
of Conduct for Transnational Corporations" 
which is being prepared; 
(c) Regulation of the behaviour of the 
United States consulting and engineering firms 
which sell services in LAC in order to prevent 
restrictive practices or trade abuses arising 
from their power; 
(d) Sustained support for the development 
of a local capacity to produce technology, and 
particularly for the establishment and opera-
tion of technology enterprises; 
(e) Support for the LAC countries in their 
negotiations with the World Bank, IDB and 
other international financial institutions with a 
view to eliminating the conditions which "t ie" 
their credits to the supply of foreign technolo-
gy, stimulating full use of local technological 
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goods and services (especially in consulting 
and engineering) and allocating "risk capital" 
for the establishment and operation of local 
technology enterprises; 
(f) Active co-operation in "joint projects" 
among LAC countries and support to ensure 
that they achieve full participation in "joint 
projects" at the global level; 
(g) Development of technological transac-
tions with medium-sized and small industry in 
the United States, and increased use of the 
programmes of the Small Business Adminis-
tration. 
The negotiation strategy aims to ensure 
not only that a harmful confrontation with the 
United States is transformed into active co-
operation, but also that the LAC countries 
engage in an active learning process on some 
central problems connected with the interface 
between the structure of production and tech-
nology and become aware of their principal 
shortcomings in this field. The United States 
knows how to manage technology as an opera-
tional variable and has an "implementation 
system" for decisions in this held, which 
functions in response to explicit orders from 
the political authorities. This is precisely an 
area where LAC falls seriously short, all the 
more so because there is not even full aware-
ness of its necessity and importance. The 
negotiations will bring this out very clearly, 
while at the same time clarifying relationships 
and mechanisms which are still hidden behind 
an ideological tangle of absolute pseudo-truths. 
For this reason the negotiations must constitute 
a continuous and ongoing process. 
